Inventing Around, Trade in Similar Products,

and Optimal Patent Breadths

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Abstract

This paper examines the effect of trade in imitated products, which are defined as products

invented around, on innovators' behavior and patent breadths set by governments of trading countries.

In particular, we compare unilateral patent breadth with the global optimum. To this end, we adopt a

two-country model (home and foreign) in which (i) consumers are uniformly distributed on a circle in

each country, (ii) there is one innovator in each country, (iii) there are potentially many imitators that

invent around. The location of each consumer represents preferences for differentiated products.

We find that if both home and foreign countries are symmetric including patent breadths, a change

from a closed to an open economy increases the investment amounts of innovators. We also find that,

given patent breadths set by home and foreign governments, a change in investment of the home

innovator in response to a small change in patent breadth of home patent breadth may be larger or

smaller in an open economy than in a closed economy. When "larger", the home government has a

stronger incentive to adopt broader patent protection in an open economy than in a closed economy.

Moreover, when both home and foreign countries are symmetric on innovators' invention

probability and imitators' entry probabilities, unilateral patent breadth of each government is narrower,

which means that patent protection is laxer, than the global optimum. This result holds even when

there is only a home innovator and all imitators are foreign ones. However, when the foreign country

has comparative advantage not in innovating but in producing similar products, unilateral home patent

breadth may be broader than the global optimum.

Keywords: Trade in imitation, innovation, patent breadth.

JEL Code: F12, L13.